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Deconstructing Arguments From The Case Against Hypothesis Testing
Shlomo S. Sawilowsky
Educational Evaluation and Research
Wayne State University
The main purpose of this article is to contest the propositions that (1) hypothesis tests should be
abandoned in favor of confidence intervals, and (2) science has not benefited from hypothesis testing. The
minor purpose is to propose (1) descriptive statistics, graphics, and effect sizes do not obviate the need for
hypothesis testing, (2) significance testing (reporting p values and leaving it to the reader to determine
significance) is subjective and outside the realm of the scientific method, and (3) Bayesian and qualitative
methods should be used for Bayesian and qualitative research studies, respectively.
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Introduction
The “Confidence” Interval Attack
Neyman (1934), who discovered the
bracketed interval, equated the probabilities
associated with its lower and upper bound with
“the ordinary concept of probability” (1934, p.
590). Initially, he seemed to equate it with the
fiducial argument promulgated by Fisher (1930).
The presumed lack of difference in the
derivation of bracketed intervals and fiducial
probabilities was the focus of the discussion
subsequent to the reading of Neyman’s (1934)
paper before the Royal Statistical Society.
Bowley (1934) raised the question and presented
his answer, “I am not at all sure that the
‘confidence’ is not a ‘confidence trick’… Does
it really take us any further?... I think it does
not” (p. 609). He considered bracketed intervals
to be nothing more than ordinary probabilities
expressed in a new form.
Neyman (1934) replied that “questions
raised in the discussion on the confidence
intervals would require too much space. In fact,
to clear up the matter entirely, a separate
publication is needed…[and] this is in
preparation” (p. 623). He alluded to the nature of
the response that would follow: “It has been
suggested in the discussion that I used the term
‘confidence coefficient’ instead of the term
‘fiducial probability’. This is certainly a
misunderstanding” (p. 623). Did Neyman
differentiate between his proposed bracketed
interval and the venerable hypothesis test?

There has been an increasing amount of journal
space given to the case against hypothesis
testing over the past quarter of a century. The
ensuing debate has taken many directions and
has been graced with many forms of
argumentation (see, e.g., Sawilowsky, 2003a;
Knapp & Sawilowsky, 2001). Two styles of
attack against hypothesis testing are contested
here.
The first is the proposition that
hypothesis testing should be abandoned in favor
of confidence intervals. (I prefer the term
“bracketed” instead of “confidence” interval for
reasons noted in Sawilowsky, 2003a.) Ancillary
to this attack is the proposition that hypothesis
testing is tolerable if and only if it is (a)
buttressed with a report of effect sizes, (b)
accompanied by graphical displays, or (c)
Bayesian.
The second style of attack is that
hypothesis testing should be abandoned due to
philosophical arguments. An example is
embodied in the question if science has
benefited by hypothesis testing.
_______________________________________
Shlomo Sawilowsky is Professor of Education
and Wayne State University Distinguished
Faculty Fellow. Email: shlomo@wayne.edu.
The author gratefully acknowledges discussions
on the ether with Rabbi Chaim Moshe Bergstein.
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No. Neyman (1935) immediately
disabused readers of the statistical literature of
this notion. He stated, “The problem of
estimation in its form of confidence intervals
stands entirely within the bound of the theory of
probability” (p. 116), as does hypothesis testing.
How, then, did the claim that bracketed intervals
are superior and preferred eventually arise as a
weapon in the arsenal of the camp attempting to
make a case against hypothesis testing?
Neyman
(1941)
reviewed
the
development of the bracketed interval, which is
translated from the Polish “przedzial ufności.”
He mentioned this phrase in 1930 in lectures at
the University of Warsaw and the Central
College (Agriculture) in Warsaw, Poland. Prior
to the redaction of the theory, Pytkowksi (1932)
published a practical application.
Neyman (1941) recounted that he had
noticed numerical similarities obtained with his
method and that of the fiducial argument. As a
result, he had initially assumed the two
paradigms were identical. Neyman was satisfied
with considering the bracketed interval as an
extension of the fiducial argument because
Fisher (1930) had priority.
Eventually, Neyman (1934) became
estranged from the fiducial argument. He no
longer
considered
the
two
theories
interchangeable. He left the reasons unstated in
his opening presentation before the Society.
Fisher (1934) attended the reading as a
discussant. Historical accounts of the exchange
were varied. Some expressed chagrin with
Fisher, who offered minimal comments on the
new methodology, and instead concentrated on
the relative merits of random vs purposive
sampling selection. Others, in noting Bowley’s
(1934) comment that the paper was difficult to
understand, assumed that Fisher might have
neglected to read Neyman’s paper prior to the
reading and simply didn’t follow it. Still others
proposed that this was Fisher’s feeble attempt at
blocking his baton from being passed to
Neyman, just as Karl Pearson had tried in vain
two decades prior with Fisher.
These reports misrepresented Fisher’s
response. Most of his comments were directed to
the sampling problem because that was the
primary thesis of Neyman’s (1934) paper.
Moreover, a careful review of the published

discussion indicates that Fisher understood the
paper’s implication quite well. His response was
a terse defense of the fiducial argument as the
explanation of ordinary probability.
Neyman (1941) was surprised! Fiducial
probability and the fiducial distribution of a
parameter were “more or less, lapsus linguae,
difficult to avoid in the early stages of a new
theory” (p. 129). The fiducial argument was
vague, misconceived, and vacuous in explaining
ordinary probability.
The aftermath took the form of
considerable and animated debate in the
literature on the fiducial argument. Many
mathematical statisticians, regardless of
theoretical persuasion, joined in the fray by
publishing their support or concern. Wald
(1939), Wald and Wolfowitz (1939), and Welch
(1939) sided with the bracketed interval. Fisher
(1935), Starkey (1938), Sukhatme (1938), and
Yates (1939) defended the fiducial argument.
Pitman (1939) opined that the two theories were
essentially the same, as did Bartlett (1939) to a
lesser extent.
Bartlett (1936, 1939) also escalated the
debate with the contention that where results
diverge, the fault lies within the fiducial
argument. As can be imagined, Fisher (1937,
1939a, 1939b) and Yates (1939) accepted the
gauntlet. Jeffreys (1940) attempted to restore
calm in claiming that the bracketed interval and
the fiducial argument were both subsumed under
inverse probability in the system of Bayes. This
had no effect on the debate, of course, because
few of the combatants were Bayesian. The
controversy would only die with Fisher.
Neyman (1941) succinctly described the
relationship between the two theories: “There is
none” (p. 130) because “the theories of fiducial
argument and of confidence intervals differ in
their basic conceptions” (p. 149). He was:
inclined to think that the literature on the
theory of fiducial argument was born out
of ideas similar to those underlying the
theory of confidence intervals. These
ideas, however, seem to have been too
vague to crystallize into a mathematical
theory. Instead, they resulted in
misconceptions of ‘fiducial probability’
and
‘fiducial
distribution
of
a
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parameter’… In this light, the theory of
fiducial inference is simply non-existent.
(p. 149)
Return to the “confidence” interval
attack against hypothesis testing. Fisher’s
fiducial argument as the explanation of
probability was challenged and defeated.
However, the ordinary understanding of
probability, even in its application to Fisher’s F
test, was never challenged, much less defeated.
Those who have raised the bracketed interval
attack against hypothesis testing are merely
exploiting Fisher’s discredited nomenclature and
explanation of probability as he applied it to
hypothesis testing.
Ordinary probability is synonymous in
the theories of hypothesis testing and bracketed
intervals. Certainly, this was Neyman’s (1934)
view. That is why we concluded, “There is an
illogical swagger associated with criticizing
hypothesis testing and subsequently advocating
CIs [confidence intervals]” (Compton &
Sawilowsky, 2003, p. 584).
Philosophical Attack
“Has science benefited from hypothesis
testing?” The question is silly. No reputable
quantitative physical, behavioral, or social
scientist would overlook the breadth and depth
of scholarly knowledge and its impact on society
that has accrued from over a century of
hypothesis testing. The definitive evidence:
William Sealy Gosset created the t test to make
better beer.
In an invited paper in this issue of
Journal of Modern Applied Statistical Methods,
Professor Dayton addresses alternative strategies
to hypothesis testing. The motivating reference,
Carver (1978), championed the case against
hypothesis testing. Carver’s (1978) attack was
based on a variant of the philosophical attack:
speculation and assertion. “Even if properly used
in the scientific method, educational research
would still be better off without statistical
significance testing” (p. 398). Carver (1993)
offered an “Einstein” gambit:
An example from the history of
science will help to illustrate this point.
Michelson and Morley (1887) collected
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data relevant to the speed of light, testing
the hypothesis that light travels through a
medium called luminiferous ether. If this
ether existed, then light should travel
faster when moving in the same direction
as the motion of the earth - similar to a
boat traveling faster when going
downstream compared with upstream.
Michelson and Morley interpreted their
published data, without tests of
significance, as indicating that light
traveled the same speed no matter what
direction it was traveling. However, I
subjected their published data to a simple
analysis of variance (ANOVA) and found
statistical significance associated with the
direction the light was traveling (p. < .01).
It is interesting to speculate how the
course of history might have been
changed if Michelson and Morley had
been trained to use this corrupt form of
the scientific method, that is, testing the
null hypothesis first. They might have
concluded that there was evidence of
significant differences in the speed of
light associated with its direction and that
therefore there was evidence for
luminiferous ether. If this ether existed,
then light should travel faster when
moving in the same ether. That
conclusion would have set back Einstein’s
ideas many years, because his notions
about relativity are based on light
traveling in every direction at the same
speed. Fortunately, Michelson and Morley
did not corrupt the scientific method by
testing the null hypothesis before they
interpreted their data with respect to their
research hypothesis. (p. 288)
The best research articles are those
that include no tests of statistical
significance. In a single study, these tests
can be replaced with estimates of effect
size and of sampling error, such as
standard errors and confidence intervals.
Better still, by conducting multiple
studies, replication of results can replace
statistical significance testing. (p. 289290)
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Responses to Carver’s (1993) claims
appear below. In order to understand these
remarks, it is necessary to preface with a
description of interferometer data. Carver (1993)
claimed the results were null. Indeed, the 1887
Michelson-Morley
experiment is nearly
unanimously touted as the most famous
experiment that produced a null result. (See,
e.g., Feynman, Leighton, & Sands, 1963.)
The interferometer was invented by
Michelson to estimate the speed of light. It was
refined by Michelson (1881) and by Michelson
and Morley (1887a, 1887b) in an attempt to
acquire evidence on the medium of propagation
of light called ether proposed by Aristotle. The
hypothesized value, equal to the Earth’s orbital
velocity, was approximately 30 km/s.
Michelson and Morley (1887a) did not
use hypothesis tests (which had yet to be
invented, not withstanding allegations regarding
the dating of the sign test). Initially, they
presented “the results of the observations…
graphically” (p. 333). Visual inspection led to
the conclusion there was an observed fringe
shift, although it was less than what would be
expected if the ether existed as hypothesized.
They wrote, “It seems fair to conclude from the
figure that if there is any displacement due to the
relative motion of the earth and the luminiferous
ether, this cannot be much greater than 0.01 of
the distance between the fringes” (Michelson &
Morley, 1887a, p. 333).
Next, they presented descriptive
statistics. This led to the conclusion that “the
ether is probably less than one sixth the earth’s
orbital velocity, and certainly less than one
fourth” (p. 341). Values probably less than 5
km/s and certainly less than 7.5 km/s are not
null, although different from the expected value
of 30 km/s. Some results on interferometer
experiments conducted from 1887 - 1935 are
compiled in Table 1.
The only null results via interferometry
were obtained by Kennedy in 1926. His results
were criticized by Illingsworth (1927), who
found the equipment suffered from a “reduced
optical system” (p. 692). Múnera (1998) noted
that the Kennedy experiment was unclear
regarding the local solar time of the initial
orientation of the interferometer, which may
have been at one of the four times per day that

Table 1. A Sampling Of Interferometry Results.
___________________________________________
Velocity
Experimenter
Date
(k/s)
Michelson &
Morley
1887
5 - ≤ 7.5
Morley & Miller 1902-4
8.7 ± 0.6
Morley & Miller 1905
7.5
Miller
4/1/1925
10.1 ± .33
Miller
8/1/1925
11.2 ± .33
Miller
9/15/1925
9.6 ± .33
Miller
9/23/1925
8.22
Miller
2/8/26
9.3 ± .33
Picard & Stahel 1926
6.9
Picard & Stahel 1927
1.45 ± .007
Illingworth
1927
<3-5
Michelson,
Pease,
& Pearson
1929
20
Joos
1930
< 1.5
Kennedy &
Thornkike
1932
24
Michelson,
Pease,
& Pearson
1935
20
___________________________________________

the expected shift tends to zero. Subsequent
experiments conducted by Illingsworth (1927)
with Kennedy’s equipment, but with resilvered
mirrors, presented nonnull results.
A variety of technical corrections were
introduced to account for the non-null results.
Experiments were carefully designed to rule out
rival hypotheses, such as temperature, drift, sign
of displacement, diurnal variation, and intersession averaging. Nevertheless, no study
produced null results.
Most interferometer experiments were
conducted by Miller (1933). He took more than
200,000 readings from 1902 - 1927 based on
12,500 turns of the interferometer, including a
joint effort with Morley in the early 1900s. (In
comparison, Michelson and Morley made 36
turns in four days, and Piccard and Stahel made
96 turns in Belgium and 60 turns in Brussels.)
Yet, Miller never obtained a null result.
Shankland (et al., 1955) was Miller’s
assistant, and subsequently was Professor of
physics at Case Western Reserve University
(where Morley was Professor of chemistry until
1906). After the death of his boss, he criticized
Miller’s work on the ether, notably with
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assistance from Albert Einstein. DeMeo (2000,
2001) strenuously defended Miller against
Shankland’s criticisms. (The reader interested in
the dissident literature on ether should read
DeMeo, 2000, 2001; and Múnera, 1998). Later,
Shankland (1973, p. 2283) cited a letter received
from Einstein dated 31 August 1954:
I thank you very much for sending
me your careful study about the Miller
experiments.
Those
experiments,
conducted with so much care, merit, of
course, a very careful statistical
investigation. This is more so as the
existence of a not trivial positive effect
would affect very deeply the fundament
of theoretical physics as it is presently
accepted.
You have shown convincingly that
the observed effect... has nothing to do
with ‘ether-wind’, but has to do with
differences of temperature.
Einstein’s letter is instructive for many
reasons. First, he believed the interferometer
experiments on the ether “merit, of course, a
very careful statistical analysis” [emphasis
added]. Second, as late as the year of his death,
Einstein still believed that the interferometer
experiments were a threat to his special theory
of relativity. Third, he had not updated his
knowledge many years after the specter of
temperature as a confounding variable was first
raised. The Cleveland Plain Dealer (27 January
1926) published an exchange between Einstein
and Miller, with the latter concluding,
“The trouble with Prof. Einstein is
that he knows nothing about my results,”
Dr. Miller said. “He has been saying for
thirty years that the interferometer
experiments in Cleveland showed
negative results. We never said they gave
negative results, and they did not in fact
give negative results. He ought to give me
credit for knowing that temperature
differences would affect results. He wrote
to me in November suggesting this. I am
not so simple as to make no allowance for
temperature.”
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In his experiments in 1923, and from
1925 - 1926 at Mt. Wilson, Miller took many
steps to control for the effects of temperature.
The results were consistent with earlier
measurements. Similarly, Miller (cited in Joos &
Miller, 1934) noted, “when Morley and Miller
designed their interferometer in 1904 they were
fully cognizant of this... Elaborate tests have
been made... especially with artificial heating,
for the development of methods which would be
free from this effect [of temperature]” (p. 114).
The Cleveland Plain Dealer (27 January 1926)
added, “Speaking before scientists at the
University of Berlin, Einstein said the ether drift
experiments [were null in the Michelson-Morley
experiment but] on Mount Wilson they showed
positive results”, although he attributed it to
temperature and altitude.
Einstein Gambit Declined
There were thousands of interferomic
studies conducted by dozens of physicists since
1887, and in all but one experiment the results
were demonstrably non-null. The only known
null result was subsequently determined to be
caused by a miscalibrated instrument. When the
instrument was resilvered, and the experiment
replicated in the same location, the results were
about 4 km/s.
Carver (1993) conducted a simple
analysis of variance (ANOVA) and found
statistical significance (p < .01). These results
are tenable, assuming the null hypothesis was
the observations did not differ from zero.
Nevertheless, Carver’s (1993) analysis suffers
from a bewildering array of questions, such as:
•

•
•
•

What data set was used? Was it from the
noon readings, the afternoon readings,
or a combination of readings? Was it
from July 8th, 9th, 11th, or 12th of 1887;
or perhaps some combination of days?
Did it include all 36 turns of the
interferometer, or some subset?
What was the value of F?
What were the degrees of freedom?
Were the underlying assumptions of
independence, homoscedasticity, and
normality considered?
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•
•
•

Were covariates such as diurnal
variation or drift considered?
How was intersession averaging based
on different calibration curves handled?
According to Carver’s (1993) advice
and recommendation, why did he fail to
present summary statistics or a graphic
display of the results (either prior to the
ANOVA or afterwards)?

Carver (1993) claimed that this
significant result from the hypothesis test would
have set Einstein back many years. This is
unwarranted speculation. In his lecture in Berlin,
Einstein rejected the 1887 Michelson-Morley
results as being nonnull, despite the evidence
contained within their descriptive statistics and
graphs. Similarly, he would have ignored the
outcome of a hypothesis test.
Einstein’s theory was not based on any
experimental evidence. At various times
throughout his career, Einstein reminisced that it
was based on the principles of Maxwell and
Lorentz, and he had not relied on the MichelsonMorley experiment. Holton (1969, 1988)
suggested that not only did the interferometer
experiments have little or no impact, but there is
evidence that Einstein was unaware of the
Michelson-Morley
experiment
prior
to
developing the special theory of relativity.
Interferometer experimenters presented
graphical displays, from simple scatter grams
and histograms to more complex time series
charts
and
hodograms.
All
pictorial
representations substantiated nonzero results.
Some of the latter interferometer experimenters
reported standard errors. (Obviously, those who
did not were remiss.) Many of the latter
experimenters also reported bracketed intervals,
and zero was not in them. Múnera (1998)
summarized the bulk of interferometer studies
with a bracketed interval, and zero was not in it.
If statistical tests had been invented by 1887, it
would have been easy to confirm the data were
statistically significantly different from zero.
Even Shankland (et al., 1955; 1973) was forced
to admit this.
Carver (1993) reported an effect size
(eta squared) of .005. He concluded “if
Michelson and Morley had been forced … to do
a test of statistical significance, they could have

minimized its influence by reporting this effect
size measure indicating that less that 1% of the
variance in the speed of light was associated
with its direction” (p. 289). The fallacy of his
analysis is Michelson and Morley’s (1887a,
1887b) experiment obtained results of 5 to 7.5
km/s. Regardless of what percent of variance it
represents, how can anyone call a speed that
exceeds the Earth’s satellite orbital velocity
“null” and “seek to minimize its influence”?
Of paramount importance, however,
Carver (1993) tested the wrong hypothesis. Data
inspection and graphs demonstrated interferomic
data did not support the static model of
luminiferous ether as a medium of propagation
for light. Should a hypothesis test be desired, the
correct test is whether the data were statistically
significantly different – not from zero – but
rather, from the hypothesized value of 30 k/s.
Carver (1993) described the process of
conducting hypothesis tests prior to examining
descriptive data as a corruption of the scientific
method. This is a straw-person argument. Who
promotes conducting hypothesis tests as a first
step in the analysis of data? Who objects to
examining raw data (e.g., for data entry errors,
outliers), computing descriptive statistics, and
inspecting graphics prior, or as a follow-up, to
conducting hypothesis tests?
Carver (1993) stated the best research
articles are those that contain no hypothesis
tests. This regressive approach would truly set
quantitative physical, behavioral, and social
science back more than a century. Reasonable
people have different expectations of what
constitutes a rare event vs what constitutes a
common event expected by chance alone. This is
true with a single study, and all the more so with
many replications of a study. The debate is
diminished, and possibly vanishes, with the
simple agreement on a threshold (i.e., nominal
alpha level) prior to conducting an experiment.
Carver’s (1993) reliance on reporting
effect sizes as a panacea is naïve. Effect sizes
are sensitive to their own underlying
assumptions. In addition, the process of
enclosing effect sizes in a bracketed interval
relies on the same probabilities as does the
obtained value of a hypothesis test. Carver
(1993) also recommended the practice of
reporting an effect size whether the hypothesis
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test “is significant or not” (p. 288). This leads to
the “trouble with trivials” problem (see e.g.,
Sawilowsky, 2003b, 2003c).
Currently, it is a popular slogan among
effect size enthusiasts to warn against
“becoming stupid in another metric.” Yet,
Carver (1993) interpreted an eta squared of .005
as null to minimize the study outcome. The
experimental results Carver (1993) sought to
minimize were speeds of over 16,750 miles per
hour!
The Next Generation of Arguments
As soon as these two lines of attack
against hypothesis testing falter, three more
assaults are quickly proffered. This is not the
place to elaborate on them, but they are parried
briefly below.
The first is to replace hypothesis testing
with significance testing. P values are reported
and it is left to the reader to decide if it is
significant. Aside from being outside the realm
of the scientific method, subjective significance
testing is, in my view, a recipe for disaster
(Knapp & Sawilowsky, 2001). (Note that
Carver’s, 1978, 1993, attack is actually against
hypothesis testing, although he calls it a case
against significance testing.)
The second is to abandon the frequentist
approach and conduct a Bayesian analysis. I
strongly promote the method of Bayes in
selecting a pinch hitter in baseball because of the
plethora of informative priors. However, in the
absence of definitive objective priors, a
condition that pervades most of physical,
behavioral, and social science, Bayesian
methods are not likely to be optimal.
The third is to abandon quantitative
methodology altogether in favor of qualitative
techniques. I discussed this option elsewhere
(Sawilowsky, 1999). Qualitative methods should
be used when the research hypothesis is
qualitative, not because of some perceived
limitation of a quantitative method in pursuing a
quantitative research question.
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